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Why Are Women Less Democratic Than Men? Evidence from Sub-Saharan African Countries

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Why are women less democratic than men? Evidence from Sub-Saharan African countries*

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Abstract

A substantial literature has examined the determinants of support for democracy and although existing work has found a gender gap in democratic attitudes, there have been no attempts to explain it. In this paper we try to understand why females are less supportive of democracy than males in a number of countries. Using data for 20 Sub-Saharan African countries, we test whether the gap is due to individual differences in policy priorities or to country-wide characteristics. We find that controlling for individual policy priorities does not offset the gender gap, but those women who are interested in politics are more democratic than men. Furthermore, our results indicate that the gap disappears in countries with high levels of human development and political rights.

JEL Classification: D01, J16, O38, O55

Key words: Support for democracy, gender gap, policy priorities, institutions

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1 Introduction

Many nations across the world are democracies, others are not, and these differences have important implications for the welfare of their citizens both because of the value of democracy in itself but also because of the potential economic implications that greater democracy has.¹ The variety of political systems we observe raises the question of why some countries are democratic and others less so, and various candidate explanations have been proposed. Economists have pointed out that the average level of education and income are deep causes of a country's level of democracy and tested this hypothesis using cross-country data, while political scientists argue that democratic legitimacy² is the key determinant of the level of democracy.³ The latter literature has focused on the role played by individual political attitudes, and maintains that the consolidation and stability of a democracy in a country is only possible if its citizens support the democratic regime.⁴

A recent literature has thus emerged that measures the degree of *support for democracy* and has found it to be strong in some countries but not in others. Explanations of these differences have focused extensively on testing Lipset's claim that education is a pre-condition for democracy, and household survey data indicates that more educated individuals are more likely to support democracy (see, for example, Bratton and Mattes 2005 and Evans and Rose 2007). Amongst the many individual characteristics included, existing analyses control for gender and find that in developing countries women tend to exhibit less support for democracy than men. Surprisingly, this recurrent gender gap has received no attention in the literature. The aim of this paper is to establish whether, in developing countries, there exists a gender gap in attitudes towards democracy and to consider possible explanations.

There are reasons to believe that men and women have different political attitudes. Recently, a substantial body of work has documented that the two sexes behave differently in politics, as they vote differently and do not implement the same policies.⁵ It is then possible that the

¹Sen (1999a) and Sen (1999b) discusses democracy as a universal value. The literature on whether democracy is positively associated with per capita GDP levels and long-run growth has been the subject of substantial controversy, although a number of recent works point towards a positive effect; see Acemoglu et al. (2005), Persson (2004), and Persson and Tabellini (2006), amongst others.

²According to Fails and Pierce (2010), the definition of legitimacy attitudes proposed by Lipset (1963) reflects the "*belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society*".

³For the work of economists see, for example, Barro (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2008), while the approach proposed by political scientists can be found in Diamond (1999) and Mattes and Bratton (2007).

⁴Diamond (1999), p. 168, reports that "*stable democracy also requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy*". More recently Mattes and Bratton (2007), p. 193, maintain that "*No matter how well or badly international aid donors or academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a given country, this form of regime will only consolidate if ordinary people believe that democracy is being supplied.*"

⁵See for, example, Lott and Kenny (1999), Abrams and Settle (1999), Aidt and Dallal (2008), and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) as well as our discussion below.

two sexes also have different preferences towards democracy. The evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that, on average, 73 percent of men believe that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, while only 65 percent of women agree with this statement.⁶ There are several potential explanations for this 8 point gap. First, it could simply reflect different attitudes towards democracy across genders that are embedded in the preferences of the two sexes. The gap could also be due to the omission of relevant individual characteristics, such as access to media, that are distributed differently across the two groups. Women's lower support for democracy may also be caused by differences in policy priorities across genders, with men being more interested in the process through which decisions are taken and women in the actual policy outcomes. Alternatively, the gap could be caused by the economic and institutional context of the country, in line with the modernization hypothesis of Inglehart (1997) which argues that a change in the economic and political environment reduces the differences in roles between males and females and increases women's interest in issues traditionally considered to be the domain of men, such as politics. Distinguishing between these explanations is important if we are to understand whether democratic support by women can be increased and if so through which mechanism.

To conduct our analysis we use data from the Afrobarometer, a series of national surveys on the attitudes of citizens towards democracy, markets, civil society, and other aspects of development collected in African countries. Our variable of interest is support for democracy, a dummy that equals one if the individual attests that democracy is the best political regime and zero otherwise. We consider three sets of possible explanatory variables. The first is a wide set of socioeconomic characteristics which prove significant but have a minor effect on the coefficient on gender. In addition to the information on individual socioeconomic characteristics, the survey asks individuals what are the policy priorities that they think the government should tackle. We use this information to assess whether males and females have different priorities and if this prioritization of government action leads them to express different degrees of support for democracy. Although our data indicate that women are more concerned with social policies and men with the political decision process, including the individual's policy priorities in our regressions for support for democracy has no impact on the coefficient on gender.

The evidence hence indicates a gender gap in support for democracy, and the last question that we address is to what extent this gap is affected by the macroeconomic and institutional context. We thus examine the effect of three sets of country-wide characteristics: the human

⁶See below for the details.

development indicator (HDI), different measures of political institutions, and gender gaps in various aspects of political and economic life. Although these variables prove insignificant for the population as whole, we find that higher levels of both the HDI and political institutions reduce the gender gap. Our results imply that in countries with sufficiently high levels of HDI and/or institutions there is no difference between men and women in the degree of democratic support, with the effect of gender being insignificant in between a quarter and half of the countries in our sample depending on the specification. This evidence supports the view that economic and institutional changes can change individuals' views on democracy.

Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to a substantial body of work addressing the determinants of support for democracy in developing countries using survey data. This literature has largely focused on establishing the importance of education for promoting democracy; see, for example, Mattes and Bratton (2001) and Bratton and Mattes (2005) on Sub-Saharan Africa, and Shafiq (2010) on Lebanon, Jordan and Pakistan.⁷ Evans and Rose (2007) emphasize the differential impact of various stages of education for political attitudes. Their work on Malawi, as well as that of Mattes and Mughogho (2009) on all the Afrobarometer countries, indicates that primary schooling is sufficient for the endorsement of democracy and rejection of non-democratic regimes, with higher levels of education having a limited impact.⁸ Survey data has also been used to examine the “democratic paradox of Islam”, i.e. the fact that democracy is popular yet rare in Muslim-majority countries; see Rowley and Smith (2009). Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) maintain that the positive attitudes towards democracy of citizens in Muslim countries should not be explained by religion but rather by decreasing marginal utility. The scarcity of democracy -which tends to be a feature of Muslim-majority countries- implies that residents in those countries value it more than those from countries where the supply of democracy is larger.

In all of the above analyses -with the exception of Shafiq (2010)- the significant coefficient on gender indicates that women are less supportive of democracy than men, yet the reasons for this gap have not been examined. Closely related to our work is Coffe and Bolzendahl (2011) who examine gender gaps in political participation in Sub-Saharan Africa. As is the case in Western countries (e.g., Burns 2007) there is a substantial difference in the degree of political participation of men and women. However, Coffe and Bolzendahl show that the individual socioeconomic characteristics that have been found to be important in explaining this gap in

⁷See, for example, Bratton and Mattes (2005) and Mattes and Bratton (2001).

⁸Despite a strong effect of education on political preferences, its impact on political participation is less clear; see Mattes and Mughogho (2009).

Western countries do not reduce significantly the gap in Sub-Saharan Africa. They postulate that institutions are important and find a negative correlation between a country's gender gap in participation and the quality of its political institutions. These results indicate that the institutional framework could be an important determinant of differences across genders in support for democracy too. Our approach differs from that of Coffe and Bolzendahl (2011) methodologically since we include institutions in the individual regressions rather than looking at cross-country correlations with average gender gaps. This allows us to examine the magnitude of the effect of institutions as compared to that of individual characteristics.⁹

Our work is also related to the influential literature on the differences between men and women in political preferences and behaviour, which we discuss in detail in the next section. Our paper differs from this literature in two aspects. First, existing work has focused on the effect of differences in policy preferences across genders either on voting or on government expenditure. We examine whether differences in preferences can explain the gender gap in support for democracy, a question so far not addressed by the literature. Second, previous analyses have used data for either Western countries or India, all of which are established democracies. In contrast, we focus on sub-Saharan Africa, a region in which democracy is a relatively new concept. There is, to the best of our knowledge, no previous analysis of the political attitudes of women in this part of the world, whether in order to understand gender differences in policy priorities or the consequences of the latter.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. We start by a discussion of the relationship between gender and politics that reviews the existing literature and postulates our hypotheses about the gender gap in political participation. Section 3 describes the data, while section 3 sets up the empirical model. In section 4 we discuss the results, testing whether the gender gap holds for our data before moving onto the central analysis of the paper. Some robustness checks are reported in section 5, while the last section concludes.

2 Political attitudes and gender

2.1 Related literature

It is well established that men and women vote differently, with women tending to support more left-wing parties; see Langer (1996). Over the past decade and following the seminal work of Lott and Kenny (1999) and Aidt and Dallal (2008), economists have started examining the causes of

⁹In fact, as we will see below, one of the advantages of our approach is that by including country-level measures of institutions in regressions on individual data we can examine whether or not good institutions can erode the impact of gender differences. This cannot be done when regressing national average gaps on country features.

differences in political attitudes of men and women and their impact on economic policy. Three reasons have been put forward as explanations of gender differences in preferences for parties and policies: women’s greater risk aversion and the consequent desire for insurance; women’s lower incomes or expected incomes, for example following a prospective divorce, leading to support for redistribution; and a preference for social expenditures such as basic infrastructure (e.g. water supplies), health and education that impact the production of household goods, including children, on which women tend to specialize; see Lott and Kenny (1999) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). The evidence indicates that the effect of women’s entry into the political arena, either as voters or as policy-makers has been substantial. Lott and Kenny (1999) use cross-sectional data for US states over the period between 1870 and 1940 to examine the impact of female suffrage on the size of public expenditure and, in particular, on social spending. Their results indicate that women’s vote resulted in both larger government and increased social spending, a result also found in Western European countries where government spending moved away from “guns” and into “butter”; see Aidt and Dallal (2008).

Following this literature two different questions have been addressed by recent work. The first one tries to establish whether differences such as those found in voting behavior also appear when women are policy-makers. Work on both rich and developing countries indicates that this is indeed the case. Evidence for India shows that the type of public goods provided depends strongly on the gender of the local political leader, with female leaders investing more in goods linked to their own concerns, such as drinking water, and spending more in public health provision; see Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Clots-Figueras (2011) and Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2011). In the case of rich countries, where the distinction between ‘women oriented’ and ‘male oriented’ public goods is less clear, the evidence has concentrated on social spending, and recent work on Switzerland by Funk and Gathmann (2010) indicates that female policy-makers affect the composition of public spending, tending to increase spending on public health and social welfare.

A complementary literature has seek to understand and test the causes of these differences across genders. Edlund and Pande (2002) and Edlund et al. (2005) focus on the role of marriage patterns. The last three decades of the 20th century have witnessed a decline in marriage, whether because of divorce (the most prevalent cause in the US) or due to the possibility of forming other types of unions (a pattern common in much of Western Europe). These changes have made men richer while women have become poorer and face greater income uncertainty. Economic theory then implies that the latter will demand greater income redistribution and more

family-oriented social spending, and this could have been the cause of the observed changes in public expenditure. In contrast, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011) argue that higher government spending reduces the cost of housework, with child-care being the most obvious example. This implies that the opening of labour markets to female employment that occurred in the mid-20th century also increased the demand for social spending. Both hypotheses seem to be supported by the data, either in a cross section of countries or at the individual level, with Edlund and Pande (2002) finding that following divorce women become more left-wing. Such evidence indicates that the socioeconomic environment in which women live can affect the gap in their policy preferences relative to those of men. Among the various differences between women and men in the political arena, the work on corruption and gender has highlighted that females are less likely to be involved in corruption and in bribes and that increasing the share of females in the political arena and, more generally, social equality between men and women reduces the degree of corruption; see Swamy et al. (2001), Swamy et al. (2001) and Branisa et al. (2009).

Concerning, the gender gap in support for democracy, the evidence indicates that it is present in regions other than Sub-Saharan Africa. Rowley and Smith (2009) and Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) use the World Survey Values (WSV) for countries from different regions to test whether citizens from Muslim majority countries are less democratic than others. Among the different controls, they include gender and the resulting coefficient indicates that women are less democratic than men. Waldrom-Moore (1999) explores the origins of mass support for democracy using the Central and Eastern surveys from the Eurobarometer. The evidence for Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania implies that women in these countries tend to be less democratic. This result is consistent with the view that Eastern European women accept traditional roles, prefer the order and security of authoritarian rule and are less willing to accept plurality; see Bahry (1987), Carnaghan and Bahry (1990)). The only exception seems to be Shafiq (2010) who does not find a gender gap in support for democracy when looking at Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey.

2.2 Hypotheses

The literature we have just discussed indicates that men and women have different policy preferences and that gender can have a substantial effect on policy outcomes. With its focus on democratic countries, it highlights that female votes and female politicians result in different levels and composition of public expenditures than those that would have prevailed if only men had participated in the political process. The question we pose goes back one step and asks whether men and women also differ in their attitudes towards democracy.

There are various reasons why reported attitudes towards democracy may differ across genders. The first is simply that men and women have different intrinsic preferences concerning democracy, just in the same way as women tend to be more risk-averse; see, for example, Brachinger et al. (1999). A second possibility is that existing work has failed to include all the relevant individual characteristics that determine democratic support. Three aspects come to mind. The first is the difference across genders in access to media. Much media access in developing countries does not occur in the home but in communal places, such as bars or coffee houses, that women are less likely to visit. As a result, their access to information may be more limited and lead to lower democratic support. A second aspect that may affect political attitudes is the experience of corruption. Encounters with corrupt officials and bureaucrats could reduce faith in the political system and undermine support for democracy. If women tend to have more experience of these encounters, for example because they deal with these bureaucrats while running the household (i.e. establishing access to utilities, seeking medical treatment, or ensuring children's education), then these experiences will affect their political attitudes. We are also interested in the environment in which the interview took place, since the presence of children or a male relative and the need to conform to traditional female roles in front of them could affect females' responses.

A third hypothesis is that responses to the question concerning support for democracy reflect different policy priorities across genders. As we will see below, when asked about the priorities that the government should tackle, men and women give different responses. Men are more interested in politics and war, including issues like political rights and violence, while women are mainly concerned with social policies such as health, education and food shortages. It is then possible that women see the type of political regime as being of secondary concern relative to social policies and hence show less support for democracy.

Lastly, we will examine whether the country's economic and institutional environment affects gender differences in democratic support by considering the effect of three sets of country-wide characteristics: the human development indicator (HDI), political institutions, and gender gaps in education and policy-making. There are various reasons why development, good institutions and gender equality may affect political attitudes. The modernization hypothesis proposed by Inglehart (1997) and further developed by Inglehart and Norris (2003) argues that changes in the economic and political environment tend to be followed by a decrease in the differences in gender roles, and this will in turn impact the political climate. In the context of our analysis, it is conceivable that traditional gender attitudes see only men as entitled to have political opinions,

implying that women would not have a view on the desirability or not of democratization. In countries where gender differences are strong this would lead to systematic differences in support for democracy across genders, which would be absent in more gender-egalitarian societies.

There is a second reason why the institutional context may matter. Recent evidence on democratization and economic development has shown that many transitions to democracy are violent and create substantial civil conflict, and this has been particularly so in Africa. Moreover, empirical work on the effect of democratization on output and growth rates shows that the short-run effect of democratization is positive when the process is peaceful but not when it is violent.¹⁰ In this context it is possible that the different responses of men and women are related to the cost of democratization, which may be higher for women. The cost of conflict may be higher for women for reasons going from the cost of fleeing conflict areas and relocating to that of female-specific violence such as rape. Even in less extreme situations, women may expect to bear a higher cost of conflict since it will lead to an increase in military expenditure and a reduction in welfare spending, which as has been shown by the literature reviewed above, they value more than men. When institutions are weak and the level of development low, democratization is more likely to be accompanied by conflict, and the internalization of such costs may make women more cautious about supporting democracy than men. In contrast, in a more favorable economic and institutional climate the transition to democracy is more likely to be peaceful, thus reducing the gender gap in democratic support.

Our empirical analysis hence proceeds in three steps. We first consider the effect of additional socioeconomic characteristics on the gender gap in support for democracy. We next examine differences across genders in policy preferences and see whether they help us understand the gap in democratic support. Lastly, we test whether the country's economic and institutional environment has an effect on the gap.

3 Data and descriptive statistics

3.1 The Afrobarometer survey

We use the latest data from the Afrobarometer, round 4, which contains surveys that took place in 20 countries between March 2008 and June 2009. In total 27,713 individuals aged between 18 and 64 years were interviewed. The countries that took part in the survey are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and

¹⁰See Cervellati and Sunde (2011), Cervellati and Sunde (2012) and Nannicini and Ricciuti (2010).

Zimbabwe. The data was collected through face-to-face interviews with questions posed in the local language. National probability sampling is applied in order to generate a sample that is a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. For instance the method of random selection is used at each stage of the sample.¹¹ Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the core variables that we use in this paper.

Our main dependent variable is support for democracy. We construct it from the answers to question Q89 of the survey which asks: *Which of these three statements is closest to your opinion?* The possible answers are: (1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; (2) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; (3) For some like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have, and (4) I don't know. As has been done in previous work, we create a binary variable (*democracy*), which takes a value of 1 if the respondent thinks that a democratic system is preferable to any kind of political system, and 0 otherwise.¹² The data indicates strong support for democracy, with 70% of the population giving the first answer. The remaining 30% of respondents are roughly equally divided into the three other possible answers. The fraction of respondents saying that they don't know is substantial (8%), and in the robustness section we will examine whether our results are affected by their exclusion.

Our key explanatory variable is *gender* which takes a value of 1 for females and 0 for males. The data is such that 50.01% of the interviewees are males and 49.99% are females. Figure 1 depicts preferences for democracy for the two sexes. A majority of both men and women support democracy, but the figure is almost 8 percentage points higher for males, with only 65.81% of women saying that democracy is always preferable as compared to 73.55% of men. For the other three replies, the frequency is higher for women, although in the case of "in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable" the difference is not statistically different across genders.¹³

We include standard individual socioeconomic characteristics that have been used in previous work, namely education, age, place of residence, and employment status. Education is divided into 5 categories: no-formal schooling concerning 20% of the population, incomplete primary school (18%), completed primary (35%), completed secondary (15%), and completed

¹¹For more details about the survey method and questionnaires readers are invited to refer to the manual of the Afrobarometer. For details on sampling methods, readers are invited to consult the section *Survey and Methods* of the Afrobarometer available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/sampling-principles>.

¹²When we talk about support for democracy we refer to the reply that without any doubt democracy is the best political regime.

¹³The standard error of the difference of frequency across genders is 0.558 for the reply "Democracy is preferable to any kind of government. ", 0.383 for "In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable ", 0.389 for "It does not matter what kind of government we have" and 0.322 for "I don't know "

post-secondary (11%). The overall level of education is hence very low, with only 74 percent of the population having at best completed primary education.¹⁴ The three age categories are 18 to 25 year olds, those between 26 and 35, and those above 35. For the place of residence we have people living in rural areas (62%) versus urban areas (38%). The employment status has three categories: employed, unemployed and inactive.

We also consider access to media and experience of corruption. To measure access to media we consider separately the access to news from radio, TV and newspapers. For each of them the variable is a dummy which is equal to 0 if the individual attests never having access to media from that given source, and 1 otherwise. In the sample 87% of the population has access to news from radio, 54% from TV and 41% from newspapers. For the perception of corruption we code 0 for people who have never been in a situation in which they had to pay a bribe, provide a gift or do a favor to officials in exchange for a document or permit, and 1 otherwise. A relatively small fraction of the population, 21%, reply that they have experienced corruption. Because democracy can be linked to views on the current government, we measure perceptions about the government. We use the question “*how well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: managing the economy, narrowing gaps between rich and poor*”. We code *manage1* (*gappoor1*) as one if the answer concerning managing the economy (narrowing gaps) is ‘fairly well’ or ‘very well’, while *manage2* (*gappoor2*) takes the value of 1 if the individual answers that s/he does not have enough information. The reference group are thus those who answer ‘very badly’ or ‘fairly badly’.

As we have argued above, in traditional societies the replies of women may be influenced by the presence of a male during the interview. We hence consider variables that inform us about the environment through which the interview took place and which are recorded by the interviewer at the end of each interview. We create the variable *presence* that tells us whether someone (spouse, children or others) was present during the interview. The variable *check* equals 0 if the interviewee did not check his/her replies with anybody during the interview and 1 otherwise. The last two variables that we use are a dummy *influence* which is equal to 1 if the interviewer thinks that the individual is influenced by someone present and a dummy *approach* which equals 1 if any representative of community associations or political parties approached the interviewee during the interview.

¹⁴These are the categories reported in the questionnaire, and hence we do not have information on, for example, those who have had some secondary education but not completed it.

3.2 Measuring policy priorities

To shed light on the link between the differences in policy priorities between men and women and their impact on the gender gap on support for democracy we exploit the question Q56pt in the survey which asks: "*In your opinion, what should be the most important problems facing this country that the government should address?*" Each respondent can give up to three problems or say that there are no problems. A total of 36 problems are listed, which we then group into 5 categories; (1) *Macro*, (2) *Social-discrimination*, (3) *Politics-war*, (4) *Infrastructure*, and (5) *Agriculture*. We also create the category (6) *Nothing* which contains people who think that there are no problems. A description of the components for each of the first five categories is given in table 2 in the appendix. Examples of the items included in these categories are concerns over the management of the economy, unemployment and wages for macro; food shortages, education, health and women's rights for the second category; political rights and wars for the third; roads, electricity and water supplies for infrastructure; and farming policy and droughts for agriculture.

The fact that each respondent can give up to three concerns raises the issue of how to attribute policy priorities to individuals. We have used two different approaches. The first strategy, termed *priorities 1*, is to create for each priority a dummy equal to 1 if at least two out of the three problems given by an individual fall in that category and 0 otherwise. Consequently, for each individual in the survey there will be a one in a given policy priority and zero in all the others, implying that we will attribute a unique policy priority to each respondent. When using this strategy there will be a 7th category, termed *else*, that includes individuals who either report only one problem or report at least two but all in different categories. Our second strategy, *priorities 2*, consists of coding a category as 1 if the individual gave at least one concern in that category. Individuals can hence have two or three policy priorities at the same time.

Figure 2 shows the proportions of individuals that hold each policy priority. The top graph reports *priorities 1* and shows that 43.3% of the population have not given two problems in the same category of policy priorities. The bottom panel reports *priorities 2*, which, given our definition cannot add up to 100%. Obviously for any given category of policy the proportions are higher in the second graph than in the first one. For instance the percentage of individuals that have at least two concerns classified in the category *Politics-War* is 2.65%, but this value raises to 23.86% once we adopt the second codification.

3.3 Measuring the economic and institutional context

To control for the context in which the individual lives we use the Human Development Index (*HDI*), the percentage of seats held by women in the national assembly (*Nationalseats*) and the adult literacy gap between males and females (*GAP*). All of these measures come from the UNDP and the descriptive statistics are reported in table 3 in the appendix. We measure political institutions by the index of democracy (*DEM*) from Polity V, as well as the indices of political rights (*PR*) and of civil liberties (*CL*) from the Freedomhouse data. For all of these different measures we use the value for 2008, which coincides with the earliest year of interview in the surveys.

The *HDI* index measures development by combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income. It ranges between 0 for the lowest development level and 1 for full development. The average cross-country value of *HDI* is 0.454 with a standard deviation of 0.096. Mozambique records the lowest *HDI* index, 0.304, and Botswana has the highest value, 0.624. Despite widespread use, a major limitation of the *HDI* has received is that it does not account for distributional aspects, either across households or across genders.¹⁵ Because of this and given our interest in disparities across the sexes, we consider the two measures of gender gaps. On average, the percentage of seats held by women in parliament is 18.6%, with Nigeria exhibiting the lowest and Mozambique the highest values. To compute the adult literacy gap we divide the literacy rate of females aged over 15 by the literacy rate of males aged over 15, which yields an average literacy gap of 0.812.

The index of democracy takes into account the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and competitiveness of political participation. It ranges between 0 and 10, with a value of 0 denoting a full autocracy and a value of 10 a full democracy. On average the level of democracy across countries in the sample is 5.786 (standard deviation of 2.719). The only full democracy in the data is Cape Verde, and Uganda has the lowest value, 1. The political rights index reflects freedom in the political process, including the right to vote freely, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives. The index of civil liberties measures freedom of belief and of association and assembly, the protection from physical abuse and from state terror, including rights of ethnic and religions, and gender equity. In the original data both indexes, *PR* and *CL*, range between 1 and 7, with a lower value indicating higher quality of institutions. We have recorded them in an ascending order so that higher values reflect better institutions. The

¹⁵See, Harttgen and Klasen (2012) as well as Klasen and Schüler (2011).

average value for the *PR* index is 4.824 with the minimum and maximum being, respectively, the values for Zimbabwe and Cape Verde/Ghana. Zimbabwe and Cape Verde are also the countries with the lowest and highest values of the *CL* index.¹⁶

4 Empirical Strategy

We denote by $p_{ij} = \text{Prob}(\text{democracy}_{ij} = 1)$ the probability that individual i living in country j prefers a democratic regime to any alternative. In a logistic model this probability can be expressed as follows:

$$p_{ij} = \frac{\exp(z_{ij})}{1 + \exp(z_{ij})} \quad (1)$$

where

$$z_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{gender}_{ij} + \alpha_2 X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

The vector X_{ij} contains the socioeconomic characteristics of individual i in country j . Our parameter of interest is α_1 which measures the impact of gender on the probability to support democracy. A negative sign means that being female decreases the probability to support democracy compared to being male, and we are interested in whether after the inclusion of additional explanatory variables this coefficient remains significant.

It is likely that individual error terms are not independent within countries thus standard errors may be underestimated with traditional regression techniques. We use multilevel modeling in order to take such clustering into account. By allowing the intercept α_0 to vary across countries, we can write the following two-level equation system:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Level 1: } z_{ij} &= \alpha_{0j} + \alpha_1 \text{gender}_{ij} + \alpha_2 X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}, & \epsilon_{ij} &\sim N(0, \sigma^2), \\ \text{Level 2: } \alpha_{0j} &= \alpha_{00} + u_j, & u_j &\sim N(0, \gamma^2), & \epsilon_{ij} &\perp u_j \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

and combining level 1 and level 2 we obtain

$$z_{ij} = \alpha_{00} + \alpha_1 \text{gender}_{ij} + \alpha_2 X_{ij} + u_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (4)$$

The term $u_j + \epsilon_{ij}$ in equation 4 represents the random part of the model where u_j is the country-specific effect and ϵ_{ij} is the individual-level error term. To measure the correlation between individuals that share the same country we use a measure of intraclass correlation, which indicates the proportion of the variance that is explained by the clustering structure. The

¹⁶Some countries have surprisingly low levels of democracy (example of Uganda) and this is partly due to the fact that we are using a single year, 2008.

formula for the interclass correlation ρ is given by

$$\rho = \frac{\gamma^2}{\gamma^2 + \sigma^2} \quad (5)$$

The parameter σ^2 is the variance of the error term u_j and by convention in a multilevel logit model the parameter γ^2 is supposed to be equal to $\pi^2/3$ where π is the mathematical constant; see (Hox 2010).

One of the questions that we want to address is to which extent the gender gap in priorities explains the gender gap in support for democracy. In order to do so, we need to first examine whether there is a gender gap in policy preferences. We hence define ϕ_{ij}^k as the probability that individual i in country j has the policy priority k . This probability will be estimated using the following specification:

$$\phi_{ij}^k = \frac{\exp(\theta_{ij})}{1 + \exp(\theta_{ij})} \quad (6)$$

$$\theta_{ij} = \beta_{00} + \beta_1 \text{gender}_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \eta_j + \nu_{ij}, \quad \eta_j \perp \nu_{ij} \quad (7)$$

The specification of equation 4 including policy priorities is thus given by

$$z_{ij} = \alpha_{00} + \alpha_1 \text{gender}_{ij} + \alpha_2 X_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_3^k \text{priority}_{ij}^k + u_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (8)$$

where K is the number of policy priorities and priority_{ij}^k is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual has the policy priority k and zero otherwise.

We are also interested in whether the gender gap in support for democracy depends on cross-national differences in the economic and institutional environment. We will do so by incorporating a vector of aggregate variables Y_j as well as a term interacting these variables with gender. Our specification then takes the form

$$z_{ij} = \alpha_{00} + \alpha_{01} Y_j + \alpha_1 \text{gender}_{ij} + \alpha_{11} Y_j * \text{gender}_{ij} + \alpha_2 X_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_3^k \text{priority}_{ij}^k + u_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (9)$$

The parameter α_1 reflects the direct impact of gender on the probability to support democracy while α_{11} tells us the degree at which the impact of gender on the probability to support democracy depends on country features such as the level of development and the quality of institutions. A positive and significant α_{11} means that the higher the level of development and/or institutions in a given country, the smaller the gender gap in support for democracy is, with the total effect of being female given by the term $\alpha_1 + \alpha_{11} Y_j$, which obviously is country specific.

5 Results

5.1 Support for democracy

We start by reporting in table 2 the coefficients obtained when we regress the probability to support democracy on a standard set of individual variables. The first column reports the regression where *gender* is the only covariate and we add sequentially additional socioeconomic characteristics. The estimated value of the intraclass correlation is 0.088, indicating that roughly 8.8% of the variance is explained by country specificity. Column [3] mimics the standard regression run by much of the literature, with education having a positive and significant effect, and older individuals and urban residents being more likely to support democracy. The coefficient on gender is statistically and economically significant, and being a man increases support for democracy as much as the difference between having had some primary education and having completed it (the effect is given by the differences between the coefficients on *educ2* and *educ1*). Columns [4] to [6] include, sequentially, access to media, experience of corruption, dummies for the presence of someone else during the interview, and the individual's views on how the government is dealing with poverty and the economy. Most of these variables are significant and although they reduce slightly the impact of gender, its coefficient remains large and statistically significant.

Turning now to the other individual characteristics included in the regression, we find that as well as education, age plays an important role in explaining democratic support with young people supporting democracy less than their elders. Youth represents an important fraction of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in our sample 57% of individuals are between 18 and 35 years old. Little attention has been given to explaining the behavior of Africa's youth in politics, with the exception of Resnick and Casale (2011) who find that youth in Sub-Saharan Africa vote less and are less partisan than their elders. Urban residents are more supportive of democracy than those from rural areas, but once we control for access to media the coefficient on urban becomes significant only at the 10% level. We do not find a significant difference between employed and unemployed individuals, but we find that those who are inactive are less democratic. The results also show that media access plays an important role, with those getting news from the radio and from newspapers being more democratic than people who do not have access to media from any source. TV access has only a weakly significant coefficient, an aspect that may be due to the fact that it is more likely to be government-controlled than other sources of information. In addition, individuals who have experienced corruption favor democracy less than those who have never experienced corruption, suggesting that corruption

hinders democratic support.

In column [5] we control for the environment in which the interview took place through variables reported by the interviewer at the end of each meeting. Results show that the presence of someone has a negative impact on support for democracy but this impact is significant only for *presence3*. Surprisingly this indicates that having children present during the interview reduces the probability of supporting democracy but having the spouse present does not. A possible explanation is that those who have young children -for whom it is more likely that children are present- are more interested in social policies and less in the political decision making process. Also respondents who have consulted with someone before replying to some question or have been approached by a community or political party representative during the interview are less democratic.

In the last column we add further variables to measure the perception that individuals have on the actions of the government. We only kept the variables that are significant (*gap poor* and *manage*). Results support that those who think that the government is handling fairly/very well the gap between poor and rich are less supportive of democracy than those who think that the government is handling it badly. On the contrary, people who think that the government is handling fairly well or very well the management of the economy are more democratic than those who think that he is handling it badly. Individuals who claim that they do not have enough information about either issue are less democratic than the reference group.

The bottom panel of table 2 shows some goodness of fit criteria, namely, the log-likelihood values and the Bayesian information criterion. Both of these measures record their lowest values in the last column, hence in the rest of the paper our baseline specification for the estimation will be the model in column [6]. In this specification, the coefficient on gender is substantially higher than that on having had some primary education and of about the same magnitude as having regular access to a radio, indicating its economic significance.

Our results provide evidence that women are less democratic than men and are robust to the inclusion of various individual socioeconomic characteristics. Overall, the individual characteristics have only a moderate impact on the gender gap, increasing the coefficient on women from -0.396 to -0.272, i.e. by 30 percent. In particular, although education and access to media reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on gender, they do not fully explain the gap in support for democracy between males and females. This conclusion supports the existence of a gender gap, and in the following sections we test some potential explanations.

5.2 The gender gap in policy priorities

Our aim in this section is to investigate whether women and men have different political preferences which in turn explain the gap on support for democracy. As we saw in section 2, the existing literature has emphasized that females are more likely to ask more supply of social goods and less of political issues compared to males. For instance Edlund and Pande (2002) conclude that in Western Europe women’s vote resulted in government spending moving away from “guns ” and into “butter ”, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Clots-Figueras (2011) argue that in India the type of goods supplied depends on the gender of the political leaders and generally female leaders invest more in goods linked to women concerns such as drinking water, children issues or health provisions. Most of existing work has analyzed either the impact of female suffrage on government spending or the types of goods that are provided by female leaders. There are no studies that test directly on individual data whether there exists a gender gap in policy priorities. To do this, we start by defining categories of individual policy priorities before testing how the two sexes differ across the different policy priorities that we propose. We will then examine to what extent the gender gaps in policy priorities explain the gender gap in support for democracy.

Since we have two possible ways of measuring individual preferences (see section 3.2) we run regressions for both. Results using the core measure where we attribute to an individual priority k if s/he replies that at least two of the problems that the government should handle are of type k (*priorities 1*) are reported in table 3. Those for the other measure are qualitatively equivalent and are relegated to table 4 in the appendix.

Columns [1]-[5] of table 3 report the results for the estimations of the 5 different priorities and the last column, [6], shows the estimations for the category *nothing*. The results indicate that there is a gender gap in preferences for social-discrimination and politics. Being female increases the probability to consider *social-discrimination* as a policy priority (see column [2]) and decreases the probability to have *politics-war* as policy priority (see column [3]). In contrast, the coefficients on *gender* are negative but insignificant for the estimations of the probabilities to have *macro*, *infrastructure* or *agriculture* as priorities.

Education has a positive and significant impact on the probabilities to have *macro* and *politics* as priorities, no significant effect on *social-discrimination*, and a negative one on the probability to claim that infrastructure and agriculture are major problems that the government should address. Living in an urban area increases the probability to be concerned with macroeconomics, social issues and politics, and has a negative effect for the other categories.

Employment status remains significant only in the first column, indicating that unemployed people are more concerned by macroeconomic aspects than employed people. Access to media by radio decreases the probability to have *social-discrimination* as priority while access to media by TV increases the probability to have *macro* and *politics* as priorities but decreases the probability for infrastructure. Getting information from newspapers also increases the probability to have politics as priority.

The variables reported by the interviewers (*presence*, *check*, *influence*, *approach*) seem to have no significant effect on the estimations. We have also included in the table a variable *vote* which tells us whether the citizen has voted during the last elections or not. The reference group are people who have voted while the category *vote1* groups people who have not been able to vote for some reason and *vote2* are those who have decided not to vote. We do not find evidence that participation in the last election is an important determinant of the probability of having politics as priority. We have added the variable *freedomjoin* which tells us how free to join a political organization an individual feels, and the results show that individuals who think that people are not very free (*freedomjoin1*) and those thinking that people are completely free (*freedomjoin2*) have a lower probability to claim politics is the most important problem compared to people who think that there is no freedom at all. In addition, the variable *fightcorp* measures how well or badly does the government fight corruption. People who think that the government is fighting corruption well (*fightcorp1*) are more likely to be concerned about social issues and are less likely to have politics as their priority, relative to those who think that the government is fighting corruption badly.

5.3 Policy priorities and the gender gap in support for democracy

In order to test whether the differential support of democracy across genders is due to men and women having different priorities, we reestimate our core regression and add dummies for the various policy priorities: *macro*, *social-discrimination*, *politics*, *infrastructure*, *agriculture* and *nothing*. The results are displayed in table 4. Columns [1], [2] and [3] use the first measure of individual priorities while columns [4], [5] and [6] use the second one. In panel A are reported the estimates of the core variables already used in table 2, while panel B reports the estimates on priorities. Most of the signs and the coefficients of the variables in panel A remain unchanged once we control by individual policy priorities, with a few exceptions (for example, the estimated parameter on inactive people, *employ2*, becomes significant at the 1% level). The size of the coefficient on gender is not significantly different from our earlier specification, indicating that priorities per se do not explain the gender gap in democratic support.

In columns [1] and [4] we include the priorities alone without any interaction with gender. We find in [1] that only *macro* and *social-discrimination* are significant. Both have a positive sign, indicating that having *macro* or *social-discrimination* as policy preferences increases the probability to support democracy. The dummy *social-discrimination* becomes insignificant once we adopt the second measure for priorities in column [4]. Politics, infrastructure and agriculture are insignificant in all specifications.

The previous subsection provided evidence that gender affects whether an individual's priorities are politics or social aspects; see table 3 above. We next explore whether these two priorities have differential effects across the genders. To do so, we interact *gender* with these two variables, and the results are reported in columns [2] and [5]. We find that the coefficient on the interacted term between *politics* and *gender* is significant and positive, meaning that once females become interested in politics they are more supportive for democracy than men. Similar conclusions are drawn in columns [3] and [6] where we have dropped the insignificant interacted terms between *gender* and *social-discrimination*.

These results provide evidence that controlling by individual policy priorities does not offset the gender gap in support for democracy. Interestingly, the combination of the coefficient on *gender* and that on *poliwar*gender* yields a positive coefficient, indicating that once females are interested in politics they become more supportive of democracy than males.

5.4 Development, institutions and the gender gap in support for democracy

The next question we address is whether the inclusion of country level characteristics affects the gender gap. The empirical results are displayed in table 6, where we add to the previous variables country level measures of development, gender gaps, and institutions. Panels A and B report the coefficients on individual socioeconomic variables and policy priorities, respectively, while panel C presents the coefficients on country level variables, both on their own and interacted with gender. We do not find major changes on the estimated coefficients on the variables in panels A and B.

The direct impact of *gender* on support for democracy remains significant and negative in all specifications, but the absolute value of the estimated coefficient has increased substantially. In table 2, column (6), we find a coefficient on gender equals 0.272 while in table 6 after controlling by institutions this value rises to roughly 0.9. One possible interpretation is that in the former table the coefficient on gender reflects the impact of females on support for democracy when the measures of institutions are taken at their average levels, while in the latter table the coefficient on gender captures the impact of females on support for democracy when the level of institutions

are at their lowest values.

The first regression indicates that the level of *HDI* does not have a significant effect on its own but has a positive and significant coefficient when interacted with gender, suggesting that although development does not affect the political views of men it decreases the negative impact of being female on support for democracy. We next add, one by one, measures of the literacy gap between men and women, female presence in parliament, and the three measures of political institutions, civil rights, democracy and political rights. Although the gender gap in education has a negative and significant effect, the interacted term proves insignificant. This implies that in countries with large male-female gaps there is less support for democracy but the impact is the same for the two genders. Female presence in parliament proves insignificant, probably because it captures an aspect of gender equality that is too far removed from the daily experiences of the majority of the population.

Turning to the three measures of political institutions we find, first, that democracy has no impact either on its own or interacted with gender. This contrasts with the argument put forward by Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) that support for democracy is greater the less abundant it is, although the coefficient has the expected negative sign and its low significance could be due to the lack variability in the measure of democracy in our small sample of countries. Civil rights also has insignificant coefficients, while that on political rights is insignificant on its own but positive and significant when interacted with gender. Column [7] presents our preferred specification, which includes the variables that had significant coefficients in one of the previous regressions (as well as *HDI* and *PR* on their own). This equation tells us that the only aggregate variable having a (weakly) significant effect on the preferences of the whole population is the educational gender gap, while a higher level of both the *HDI* and the *PR* indices tends to reduce the gender gap in democratic support.

These results and in particular the effect of *HDI* on support for democracy seem to contradict the debate on the impact of income on democracy, as re-examined by Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2009). These two papers investigate the validity of the modernization hypothesis as defined by Lipset (1959) that emphasizes the importance of the level of economic development in the creation and consolidation of democracy. Using cross-country data and different econometric specifications, the authors find neither a positive association between income and democracy (see Acemoglu et al. (2008)) nor a positive impact of income on the transition to or from democracy (see Acemoglu et al. (2009)).

We can now evaluate the overall effect of gender on support for democracy taking into

account both the fact that country characteristics affect this gap and that women that report having as priority political concerns show more support for democracy. We use the coefficients reported in column [7] of table 6. From equation (1), we can write the odds ratio, r_{ij} , as

$$r_{ij} \equiv \frac{p_{ij}}{1 - p_{ij}} = e^{z_{ij}} \quad (10)$$

where z_{ij} is given by equation (7). The relative odds ratio in country j , defined as the odds ratio for men over that for women, is then given by

$$\frac{r_{mj}}{r_{fj}} = \frac{1}{\exp [\alpha_1 + \alpha'_{11} * HDIj + \alpha''_{11} * PRj]} \quad (11)$$

For those women who have *poliwar* as a priority we need to also add the coefficient on this term to the expression in brackets.

Using each country's values for the two aggregate variables we compute the total coefficient on gender, i.e. $(\alpha_1 + \alpha'_{11} * HDIj + \alpha''_{11} * PRj)$, and the values are reported in table 6. Column [3] reports the values for individuals for whom *poliwar* is equal to zero, while column [4] gives the overall impact when this dummy takes the value 1, i.e. it reports the country specific coefficient on gender for women who are interested in politics. In column [3], the total coefficient on gender remains negative for all countries but the effect is insignificant for Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia and South Africa. In contrast in column [4], the overall coefficient is positive and significant for these four countries and insignificant for the rest. These results imply that the gender gap in democratic support is conditional on the economic and institutional environment in which women live, with those in countries with high levels of development and political rights being as democratic as men. Moreover, in all countries, women who are interested in politics tend to show particularly strong support for democracy, surpassing in some cases that of men.

In the case where women do not have *poliwar* as a priority, the relative the relative odds ratio is lowest and not significantly different from 1 for Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia and South Africa, and highest for Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe. In the latter countries it is 1.63 and 1.79, respectively, which, evaluated at the mean level of support for men in the country implies a gap of 12 and 13 percentage points, respectively.¹⁷ For women who have *poliwar* as a priority, there is no significant difference for most countries, except for Botswana Cape Verde, Namibia and South Africa, for which women are 5 percentage points more likely to support democracy, although this gap is only significant at the 10 percent level.

¹⁷To compute these figures we use the country coefficients just reported and calculate the relative ratio $r_{mj}/r_{fj} = (\exp [\alpha_1 + \alpha'_{11} * HDIj + \alpha''_{11} * PRj])^{-1}$. Using the fact that $r_{mj} = p_{mj}/(1 - p_{mj})$ and $r_{fj} = p_{fj}/(1 - p_{fj})$ we get the difference between p_{mj} and p_{fj} . The value of p_{mj} is the one for country j

5.5 Alternative measures of democracy

In this section we explore further specifications to test the robustness of our results. The first step consists in recoding the dummy *support for democracy*. It is possible that differences in democratic support are driven by the fact that women are more likely than men not to reply to the question or to say that the political regime does not matter for them. In figure 1 we see, for instance, that there are roughly 5% of males reply they don't know, but the value rises to 10% for females. Hence we first exclude all individuals that reply "*I don't know*", and build the variable *democracy 1* which takes a value of 1 if the individual says that "*democracy is preferable to any other kind of government*" and zero if s/he replies either that "*in some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable*" or "*for some like me it does not matter what kind of government*". We also construct the dummy *democracy 2* which considers only those that say that democracy is preferable (value of 1) and those who reply that a non-democratic government may be preferable (value of 0).

The results are reported in the first two columns of table 7. Across columns the gender gap in preference for democracy remains significant and large. Comparing columns [1] and [2] with column [7] in table 6 we see, in panel B, that the covariates *socialdis* and *poliwar*gender* become insignificant when we use the dummy *democracy 2* as dependent variable. The coefficient on gender is now lower than in the earlier regression, and the effect is offset by a larger impact of political rights (coefficients of 0.0709 and 0.0832, compared to 0.052 in the previous table). In contrast, the coefficient on *HDI* interacted with gender has lost its significance. These results indicate that the difference across genders that our earlier regressions and previous work capture does not simply reflect the fact that women are less likely to express an opinion on the desirability of a democratic regime. In particular, column [2] indicates that even when the only two options consider are "*democracy is preferable*" and "*a non-democratic government can be preferable*" differences across genders persist.

As with our earlier measure of democracy, we compute the overall effect of gender on the probability to support democracy to see whether the impact of institutions is sufficiently strong to offset the direct gender effect. The computations are reported in table 8. The first two columns correspond to the estimation in column [1] of table 7, and we report the coefficient for both women who do not have *poliwar* as their policy priority and those who do; the next column corresponds to the estimation in column [2] of table 7, and we compute a single coefficient since the coefficient on *poliwar*gender* was insignificant. The results are even stronger than in table 6. For the first specification the overall coefficient on gender is significant for 11 countries

for women who do not have politics as priority and for none for those who do. For the second, it is significant for only 8 countries out of 20 countries in our sample. That is, although a gender gap in democratic support persists when we use the alternative measures, the effect of political institutions is strong and implies that in about half of the countries in our sample relatively high political rights erode this gap.

The last issue that we examine is whether the gender gap is also present when we use other views on the political system as proxies for democratic support. We consider three questions reported in the survey (questions 31, 32 and 38) which ask: whether the leader should be chosen through regular open and honest elections, whether many political parties are needed, and whether the number of turns for a leader should be limited. For each of these questions we create a dummy (denoted *elections*, *plurality* and *limits*, respectively) which takes a value of 1 if the person answers yes and zero otherwise. The results are reported in the last three columns of table 7. Surprisingly, the regression for support for elections, column [3], does not imply a gender gap. Both the coefficient on gender and those of gender interacted with aggregate variables are insignificant. Only *poliwar*gender* has a significant coefficient, implying that women are in general as likely as men to support choosing the leader through elections, and those that are interested in politics even more. The regressions for plurality and presidential limits, columns [4] and [5], replicate our main results, with the coefficient on gender being negative and significant but offset by the interaction between gender and either *HDI* or *PR*.

These results point towards the role of conflict as a possible explanation for the gender gap in democratic support. Women are as likely as men to reply that the country's leader should be chosen through elections, yet tend to disapprove of plurality and limits to terms in office. The presence of many parties and attempts to force a leader in power not to run again for election can be seen as potential sources of conflict, giving a possible explanation of why women show less support for these features of a democratic regime while being as likely as men to reply that leaders should be chosen through elections.

6 Conclusion

The role of women in development has received substantial attention in recent years. Females have been argued to take different decisions from men, whether at the level of households or in the political arena. Greater education of mothers increases the schooling of children, female control over domestic finances raises expenditures in health and food, and female policy-makers increase the availability of public goods. Based on this evidence, the 2012 World Development

Report emphasized the importance of women for development. At the same time, evidence trying to understand the determinants of support for democracy in developing countries has found that women are less supportive than men, raising the question of whether female attitudes can hamper the much-needed democratic legitimacy in these countries.

In this paper we have tried to understand to what extent there exists a gender gap in democratic support and what may be its potential causes. Our data for 20 Sub-Saharan African countries indicate that there is an 8 percentage points gap between the support expressed by men and that of women. We consider three possible hypotheses. First we examine whether socioeconomic characteristics can explain this gap. For example, women are less educated and are likely to have less access to media than men, and since both these characteristics are positively correlated with democratic support they could cause the gap. Our results indicate that even after controlling for a wide range of socioeconomic variables the gender gap remains large and significant.

We then test two further hypotheses. The first is that men and women have different policy priorities, with women being more interested in social issues and men in the political decision making process. It could then be that women see democracy as being less important than the actual policies implemented and thus are more likely to reply that in some circumstances a non-democratic regime may be better. Alternatively, the gap could be due to the economic and institutional context in which women live. The level of development, measures of gender gaps, and institutional quality may all affect women's responses. As proposed by the 'modernization hypothesis' of Inglehart (1997), changes in the economic and political environment may induce a decrease of the differences in gender roles and increase women's interest in issues traditionally considered to be the domain of men, such as politics.

We find that differences in policy priorities do not erode the gender gap. In contrast, aggregate variables have a major impact, and in countries with a sufficiently high level of the Human Development Index and political rights there is no significant difference in the replies of the two sexes. Such evidence implies that the observed gender gap in democratic support does not capture intrinsic differences in the preferences of men and women but rather that it is highly dependent on the economic and institutional climate in which women live. However, our tests for the impact of the gender gap in education or political representation at the country level indicate that these variables have no effect on differences in democratic support, raising the question of whether the modernization hypothesis is a suitable explanation for our findings. An alternative hypothesis is that women's lower support for democracy comes from the fact that

democratic transitions are often associated with civil conflict. If women have a higher cost of conflict than men, then they are less likely to support democracy. Our analysis seems to point in this direction. When asked whether the country's leader should be chosen through open elections, women respond yes as often as men. However, they are less likely to support party plurality and limits on re-election. It is possible that these two aspects are seen by women as sources of potential conflict and hence as the 'down side of democracy', which would explain their replies to the broader question of whether they think democracy is the best possible regime. The relationship between conflict, gender and democratic support is, in our view, an issue that merits detailed investigation in the future.

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Figure 1: Support for democracy by gender




Table 1: **Descriptive Statistics: Afrobarometer data**

Variable	Categories				
Support for democracy	Democracy is preferable 69.68%	Don't Know 7.68%	Doesn't matter 11.57%	Non democracy can be preferable 11.11%	
Gender	Females 49.99%	Males 50.01%			
Education	No formal 20.32%	Incomplete primary 18.34%	Completed primary 35.45%	Completed secondary 15.12%	Post secondary 10.77%
Age	[18-25] 27.36%	[26-35] 29.57%	>35 43.07%		
Location	Rural 62.18%	Urban 37.82%			
Employment	Employed 59.99%	Unemployed 5.65%	Inactive 34.36%		
Access to media	Radio 86.81%	TV 54.44%	News papers 40.66%		
Perception of corruption	Ever experienced 21.27%	Never experienced 78.73%			
Presence of someone during the interview	Noone 65.97%	Husband 6.74%	Childreen 12.27%	Someone else 14.01%	
Does the individual check someone	No 94.69%	Yes 5.31%			
Is the individual influenced	No 95.58%	Yes 4.42%			
Approached by community or party member	No 98.57%	Yes 1.43%			

Figure 2: Distribution of policy priorities




Table 2: Support for democracy

Reference	variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male	gender	-0.396*** (0.028)	-0.341*** (0.028)	-0.317*** (0.028)	-0.297*** (0.029)	-0.283*** (0.029)	-0.272*** (0.029)
No formal	educ1		0.219 *** (0.046)	0.239 *** (0.047)	0.201 *** (0.048)	0.197 *** (0.048)	0.186 *** (0.048)
	educ2		0.552 *** (0.042)	0.593 *** (0.044)	0.531 *** (0.046)	0.525 *** (0.047)	0.501 *** (0.047)
	educ3		0.676 *** (0.052)	0.729 *** (0.056)	0.649 *** (0.059)	0.636 *** (0.059)	0.607 *** (0.059)
	educ4		0.922 *** (0.059)	0.928 *** (0.063)	0.832 *** (0.068)	0.813 *** (0.068)	0.780 *** (0.068)
18-25	age2			0.102 *** (0.037)	0.106 *** (0.038)	0.109 *** (0.038)	0.104 *** (0.038)
	age3			0.295 *** (0.036)	0.299 *** (0.037)	0.309 *** (0.037)	0.307 *** (0.037)
Rural	urban			0.104 *** (0.032)	0.065 * (0.034)	0.063 * (0.034)	0.060 * (0.034)
Employed	employ1			-0.043 (0.031)	-0.032 (0.032)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.039 (0.032)
	employ2			-0.153** (0.062)	-0.128** (0.063)	-0.115* (0.063)	-0.128** (0.063)
No access	radio				0.271 *** (0.044)	0.267 *** (0.044)	0.251 *** (0.044)
	tv				0.065 * (0.039)	0.062 (0.039)	0.061 (0.039)
	paper				0.096 ** (0.039)	0.095 ** (0.039)	0.083 ** (0.039)
Never	corruption				-0.181*** (0.037)	-0.180*** (0.037)	-0.184*** (0.037)
No one	presence2					-0.024 (0.059)	-0.027 (0.059)
	presence3					-0.115*** (0.044)	-0.113** (0.045)
	presence4					0.064 (0.0446)	0.063 (0.045)
No	check					-0.213*** (0.078)	-0.203*** (0.078)
No	influence					-0.143* (0.086)	-0.150* (0.086)
No	approach					-0.436*** (0.118)	-0.376*** (0.119)
Badly	gappoor1						-0.204*** (0.038)
	gappoor2						-0.364*** (0.067)
	manage1						0.168 *** (0.033)
	manage2						-0.292*** (0.067)
	Constant	1.075 *** (0.128)	0.642 *** (0.133)	0.441 *** (0.138)	0.229 (0.142)	0.259 * (0.143)	0.306 ** (0.142)
	LL	-15638	-15438	-15116	-14777	-14690	-14607
	BIC	31306	30948	30354	29716	29604	29479
	Obs	26,938	26,897	26,501	26,062	25,953	25,918
	Nb countries	20	20	20	20	20	20

The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is support for democracy. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table 3: Gender and priorities

Reference	variable	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Male	gender	-0.047 (0.044)	0.185 *** (0.029)	-0.203 ** (0.083)	-0.040 (0.041)	-0.156 (0.152)	0.469 ** (0.225)
No formal	educ1	0.252 *** (0.093)	0.053 (0.093)	0.584 *** (0.217)	-0.031 (0.065)	-0.286 (0.201)	-0.473 (0.294)
	educ2	0.571 *** (0.083)	0.043 (0.047)	0.631 *** (0.204)	0.054 (0.204)	-0.959 *** (0.229)	-1.408 *** (0.323)
	educ3	0.654 *** (0.095)	0.011 (0.059)	1.027 *** (0.215)	-0.114 (0.082)	-0.895 *** (0.317)	-1.664 *** (0.508)
	educ4	0.850 *** (0.099)	-0.088 (0.065)	1.156 *** (0.218)	-0.368 *** (0.098)	-1.736 *** (0.500)	-2.789 *** (1.050)
18-25	age2	0.046 (0.057)	0.046 (0.039)	0.015 (0.111)	-0.068 (0.054)	0.473 * (0.255)	-1.082 *** (0.318)
	age3	-0.065 (0.059)	0.147 *** (0.039)	0.163 (0.110)	-0.096 * (0.054)	0.664 *** (0.242)	-0.759 *** (0.276)
Rural	urban	0.263 *** (0.049)	0.094 *** (0.034)	0.371 *** (0.092)	-0.433 *** (0.049)	-0.466 ** (0.200)	-0.124 (0.263)
Employed	Employ1	0.137 *** (0.047)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.097 (0.094)	-0.082 * (0.044)	0.007 (0.165)	-0.144 (0.225)
	Employ2	-0.072 (0.098)	0.067 (0.063)	-0.231 (0.179)	-0.096 (0.087)	0.077 (0.327)	-0.971 (0.732)
No access	radio	0.029 (0.078)	-0.158 *** (0.045)	-0.008 (0.170)	0.110 * (0.063)	0.179 (0.213)	-0.410 (0.259)
	tv	0.323 *** (0.061)	-0.029 (0.038)	0.424 *** (0.128)	-0.243 *** (0.052)	-0.225 (0.189)	0.314 (0.273)
	paper	0.073 (0.056)	-0.074 * (0.039)	0.592 *** (0.116)	-0.059 (0.053)	0.078 (0.215)	-0.117 (0.302)
Never	corruption	0.104 ** (0.052)	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.073 (0.098)	-0.025 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.210)	-0.304 (0.289)
No one	presence2	0.102 (0.087)	-0.038 (0.059)	-0.110 (0.165)	-0.008 (0.081)	0.084 (0.278)	-2.164 ** (1.024)
	presence3	-0.055 (0.071)	0.064 (0.044)	-0.079 (0.139)	-0.051 (0.062)	0.004 (0.230)	-0.084 (0.292)
	presence4	-0.044 (0.068)	0.032 (0.044)	-0.234 * (0.136)	0.005 (0.061)	0.197 (0.228)	-0.488 (0.342)
	check	-0.104 (0.129)	-0.062 (0.081)	-0.015 (0.245)	0.077 (0.110)	-0.036 (0.387)	0.083 (0.583)
	influence	-0.083 (0.145)	0.137 (0.088)	0.103 (0.274)	0.084 (0.121)	0.449 (0.394)	-0.223 (0.665)
	approach	-0.116 (0.213)	-0.223 * (0.133)	0.214 (0.365)	-0.159 (0.181)	-0.423 (0.729)	0.381 (0.766)
has voted	vote1	-0.054 (0.056)	0.027 (0.037)	0.176 * (0.102)	0.021 (0.053)	-0.019 (0.202)	0.401 (0.247)
	vote2	0.189 ** (0.085)	-0.027 (0.063)	0.111 (0.153)	-0.054 (0.092)	0.185 (0.335)	-0.032 (0.616)
Not free	freedomjoin1	0.112 (0.104)	0.097 (0.069)	-0.429 *** (0.157)	0.144 (0.110)	0.468 (0.477)	-0.711 * (0.380)
	freedomjoin2	0.110 (0.102)	-0.010 (0.068)	-0.552 *** (0.152)	0.329 *** (0.106)	0.440 (0.468)	-0.733 ** (0.358)
Badly	fightcorp1	-0.079 * (0.047)	0.140 *** (0.031)	-0.539 *** (0.092)	0.046 (0.042)	-0.280 * (0.165)	0.468 * (0.245)
	fightcorp2	-0.268 *** (0.096)	0.122 ** (0.054)	-0.319 (0.210)	-0.081 (0.078)	0.062 (0.232)	0.476 (0.329)
	Constant	-3.176 *** (0.182)	-1.011 *** (0.130)	-4.502 *** (0.316)	-1.950 *** (0.179)	-5.268 *** (0.596)	-4.525 *** (0.671)
	LL	-7774	-14819	-2795	-8984	-1040	-5119
	BIC	15832	29921	5874	18251	2364	1307
	Obs	24,926	24,926	24,926	24,926	24,926	24,926
	Nb countries	20	20	20	20	20	20

The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variables across columns are policies priorities. To measure policy priorities we use the first codification defined in section 3.2. The dependent variable is Macroeconomics in [1], Social-discrimination in [2], Politics-war in [3], Infrastructure in [4], Agriculture in [5] and Nothing in [6]. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
 *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%

Table 4: Support for democracy and priorities

		priority version 1			priority version 2		
Reference	variable	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Panel A							
Male	gender	-0.274*** (0.029)	-0.276*** (0.035)	-0.282*** (0.029)	-0.273*** (0.029)	-0.327*** (0.051)	-0.307*** (0.032)
No formal	educ1	0.183 *** (0.048)	0.183 *** (0.048)	0.183 *** (0.048)	0.181 *** (0.048)	0.181 *** (0.048)	0.182 *** (0.048)
	educ2	0.490 *** (0.047)	0.492 *** (0.047)	0.492 *** (0.047)	0.491 *** (0.047)	0.492 *** (0.047)	0.492 *** (0.047)
	educ3	0.595 *** (0.059)	0.593 *** (0.059)	0.593 *** (0.059)	0.590 *** (0.059)	0.591 *** (0.059)	0.591 *** (0.059)
	educ4	0.766 *** (0.068)	0.763 *** (0.068)	0.763 *** (0.068)	0.757 *** (0.068)	0.761 *** (0.068)	0.760 *** (0.068)
Panel B							
	Macro	0.168 *** (0.052)	0.172 *** (0.051)	0.162 *** (0.051)	0.088 *** (0.033)	0.098 *** (0.031)	0.096 *** (0.031)
	Socialdis	0.089 *** (0.033)	0.094 ** (0.048)	0.082 ** (0.033)	0.023 (0.037)		
	Poliwar	0.054 (0.093)			0.066 * (0.038)		
	Infras	0.068 (0.047)			-0.034 (0.034)		
	Agri	-0.183 (0.156)			-0.041 (0.039)		
	Nothing	-0.467** (0.208)	-0.476** (0.208)	-0.475** (0.208)	Ref	Ref	Ref
	Socialdis*gender		-0.021 (0.063)			0.011 (0.049)	
	Poliwar*gender		0.353 ** (0.143)	0.356 ** (0.143)		0.156 *** (0.050)	0.152 *** (0.049)
	Constant	0.267 * (0.142)	0.279 ** (0.142)	0.282 ** (0.142)	0.269 * (0.152)	0.271 * (0.143)	0.272 * (0.143)
	LL	-14596	-14595	-14595	-14599	-14598	-14598
	BIC	29517	29505	29495	29513	29491	29481
	Obs	25,918	25,918	25,918	25,918	25,918	25,918
	Nb countries	20	20	20	20	20	20

Table 5: Support for democracy and institutions

Reference	Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A								
Male	gender	-0.857*** (0.138)	-0.926*** (0.160)	-0.896*** (0.140)	-0.923*** (0.141)	-0.929*** (0.151)	-0.844*** (0.138)	-0.922*** (0.141)
No formal	educ1	0.180*** (0.048)	0.181*** (0.048)	0.179*** (0.048)	0.181*** (0.048)	0.181*** (0.048)	0.180*** (0.048)	0.183*** (0.048)
	educ2	0.487*** (0.047)	0.487*** (0.047)	0.486*** (0.047)	0.490*** (0.047)	0.488*** (0.047)	0.488*** (0.047)	0.492*** (0.047)
	educ3	0.587*** (0.059)	0.589*** (0.059)	0.586*** (0.059)	0.589*** (0.059)	0.588*** (0.059)	0.588*** (0.059)	0.592*** (0.059)
	educ4	0.762*** (0.068)	0.762*** (0.068)	0.760*** (0.068)	0.764*** (0.068)	0.763*** (0.068)	0.762*** (0.068)	0.766*** (0.068)
Panel B								
	Macro	0.163*** (0.051)	0.164*** (0.051)	0.163*** (0.051)	0.163*** (0.051)	0.163*** (0.051)	0.163*** (0.051)	0.164*** (0.051)
	Socialdisp	0.082** (0.033)	0.082** (0.033)	0.082** (0.033)	0.083** (0.033)	0.082** (0.033)	0.082** (0.033)	0.082** (0.033)
	Poliwar*gender	0.330** (0.143)	0.328** (0.143)	0.323** (0.143)	0.335** (0.143)	0.331** (0.143)	0.329** (0.143)	0.335** (0.143)
	Nothing	-0.464** (0.209)	-0.466** (0.209)	-0.469** (0.209)	-0.466** (0.209)	-0.466** (0.209)	-0.464** (0.209)	-0.467** (0.209)
Panel C								
	HDI	-0.683 (1.324)	0.927 (1.471)	-0.485 (1.286)	-1.009 (1.520)	-0.815 (1.742)	-0.707 (1.533)	0.942 (1.823)
	HDI*gender	1.266*** (0.297)	1.093*** (0.356)	1.149*** (0.306)	0.857** (0.347)	0.960** (0.393)	1.025*** (0.347)	0.856** (0.347)
	GAP		-1.660** (0.843)					-1.531* (0.896)
	GAP*gender		0.181 (0.208)					
	NSEATS			-0.019 (0.014)				
	NSEATS*gender			0.005 (0.0031)				
	CL				0.017 (0.157)			
	CL*gender				0.043 (0.036)			
	DEM					0.003 (0.058)		
	DEM*gender					0.017 (0.013)		
	PR						0.042 (0.099)	-0.018 (0.099)
	PR*gender						0.052** (0.023)	0.052** (0.023)
	Constant	0.610 (0.609)	1.238* (0.646)	0.873 (0.622)	0.548 (0.618)	0.581 (0.665)	0.604 (0.608)	1.210* (0.695)
	LL	-14586	-14584	-14584	-14585	-14585	-14583	-14581
	BIC	29497	29513	29513	29514	29525	29511	29519
	nb obs	25,918	25,918	25,918	25,918	25,918	25,918	25,918
	nb countries	20	20	20	20	20	20	20

The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is *support for democracy*. We use the first codification to measure policy priorities. All the regressors that are in column 6 of table 2 have been included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table 6: Coefficients at country level

Country	Country HDI	Values PR	Total coeff on gender		Relative odds ratio	
			Poliwar=0	Poliwar=1	Poliwar=0	Poliwar=1
Benin	0.419	6	-0.250 *** (0.046)	0.085 (0.148)	1.284	0.919
Botswana	0.624	6	-0.075 (0.059)	0.260 * (0.150)	1.078	0.771
Burkina	0.321	3	-0.491 *** (0.053)	-0.156 (0.151)	1.633	1.168
Cape Verde	0.563	7	-0.075 (0.054)	0.260 * (0.149)	1.078	0.771
Ghana	0.519	7	-0.112 ** (0.052)	0.223 (0.149)	1.119	0.800
Kenya	0.493	4	-0.291 *** (0.041)	0.044 (0.145)	1.338	0.957
Lesotho	0.436	6	-0.236 *** (0.043)	0.099 (0.147)	1.266	0.905
Liberia	0.328	5	-0.380 *** (0.055)	-0.045 (0.152)	1.463	1.046
Madagasc	0.483	4	-0.300 *** (0.039)	0.035 (0.144)	1.349	0.965
Malawi	0.377	4	-0.390 *** (0.038)	-0.055 (0.146)	1.478	1.057
Mali	0.346	6	-0.313 *** (0.064)	0.022 (0.156)	1.367	0.978
Mozambique	0.304	5	-0.401 *** (0.062)	-0.066 (0.155)	1.493	1.068
Namibia	0.613	6	-0.084 (0.056)	0.251 * (0.149)	1.088	0.778
Nigeria	0.446	4	-0.331 *** (0.035)	0.004 (0.144)	1.392	0.996
Senegal	0.451	6	-0.223 *** (0.041)	0.112 (0.146)	1.249	0.894
South Afr	0.608	6	-0.088 (0.055)	0.247 * (0.148)	1.092	0.781
Tanzania	0.448	4	-0.330 *** (0.035)	0.005 (0.144)	1.390	0.995
Uganda	0.43	3	-0.397 *** (0.048)	-0.062 (0.148)	1.488	1.064
Zambia	0.413	5	-0.307 *** (0.034)	0.028 (0.145)	1.359	0.973
Zimbabwe	0.338	1	-0.580 *** (0.081)	-0.245 (0.162)	1.787	1.278

Table 7: **Alternative measures of support for democracy**

Reference	Variable	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Panel A						
Male	gender	-0.778*** (0.151)	-0.643*** (0.211)	-0.192 (0.153)	-0.491*** (0.136)	-0.606*** (0.138)
No formal	educ1	0.094 * (0.055)	0.150 ** (0.074)	0.121 ** (0.054)	0.046 (0.046)	0.285 *** (0.048)
	educ2	0.250 *** (0.053)	0.297 *** (0.070)	0.152 *** (0.051)	0.230 *** (0.044)	0.451 *** (0.046)
	educ3	0.356 *** (0.065)	0.349 *** (0.086)	0.280 *** (0.064)	0.294 *** (0.056)	0.630 *** (0.059)
	educ4	0.533 *** (0.073)	0.430 *** (0.094)	0.356 *** (0.072)	0.443 *** (0.063)	0.682 *** (0.066)
Panel B						
	Macro	0.121 ** (0.055)	0.154 ** (0.074)	0.078 (0.055)	-0.116** (0.046)	0.115 ** (0.051)
	Socialdis	0.066 * (0.036)	0.069 (0.048)	-0.054 (0.035)	0.0403 (0.031)	0.008 (0.032)
	Poliwar*gender	0.327 ** (0.154)	0.111 (0.185)	0.325 ** (0.158)	0.254 * (0.134)	0.104 (0.138)
	Nothing	-0.486** (0.231)	-0.371 (0.306)	-0.023 (0.231)	-0.080 (0.200)	-0.251 (0.207)
Panel C						
	HDI	2.052 (1.825)	3.236 * (1.768)	0.626 (1.706)	0.266 (1.067)	-0.518 (1.923)
	HDI*gender	0.491 (0.368)	0.151 (0.489)	0.147 (0.375)	-0.0811 (0.327)	0.878 ** (0.345)
	GAP	-1.823** (0.896)	-1.703** (0.863)	-1.270 (0.836)	-0.339 (0.521)	-0.697 (0.945)
	PR	-0.051 (0.099)	-0.171* (0.097)	-0.058 (0.093)	-0.0532 (0.0583)	-0.0472 (0.105)
	PR*gender	0.071 *** (0.025)	0.083 ** (0.036)	0.012 (0.025)	0.071 *** (0.022)	0.002 (0.023)
	Constant	1.664 ** (0.697)	2.513 *** (0.680)	2.054 *** (0.651)	1.035 ** (0.410)	1.451 ** (0.732)
	LL	-12568	-7916	-13150	-16086	-14939
	BIC	25488	16181	26656	32528	30234
	Nb obs	24,041	21,053	25,916	25,920	25,917
	Nb country	20	20	20	20	20

Table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, The dependent variable is *democracy1* in [1] and *democracy2* in [2]. All the regressors that are in column 6 of table 2 have been included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table 8: Coefficient at country level

country	Country Values		Total coeff on gender [1]		Total coeff on gender [2]
	HDI	PR	poliwarped=0	poliwarped=1	poliwarped=0
Benin	0.419	6	-0.353 (0.242)	-0.026 (0.289)	-0.218 (0.247)
Botswana	0.624	6	-0.353 (0.242)	-0.026 (0.270)	-0.218 (0.247)
Burkina	0.321	3	-0.565*** (0.217)	-0.238 (0.256)	-0.430** (0.203)
Cape Verde	0.563	7	-0.282 (0.255)	0.045 (0.298)	-0.147 (0.270)
Ghana	0.519	7	-0.282 (0.255)	0.045 (0.298)	-0.147 (0.270)
Kenya	0.493	4	-0.494** (0.223)	-0.167 (0.271)	-0.359* (0.213)
Lesotho	0.436	6	-0.353 (0.242)	-0.026 (0.287)	-0.218 (0.247)
Liberia	0.328	5	-0.424* (0.231)	-0.097 (0.278)	-0.289 (0.228)
Madagascar	0.483	4	-0.494** (0.223)	-0.167 (0.271)	-0.359* (0.213)
Malawi	0.377	4	-0.494** (0.223)	-0.167 (0.271)	-0.359* (0.213)
Mali	0.346	6	-0.353 (0.242)	-0.026 (0.287)	-0.218 (0.247)
Mozambique	0.304	5	-0.424* (0.231)	-0.097 (0.278)	-0.289 (0.228)
Namibia	0.613	6	-0.353 (0.242)	-0.026 (0.287)	-0.218 (0.247)
Nigeria	0.446	4	-0.494** (0.223)	-0.167 (0.271)	-0.359* (0.213)
Senegal	0.451	6	-0.353 (0.242)	-0.026 (0.287)	-0.218 (0.247)
South Afr	0.608	6	-0.353 (0.242)	-0.026 (0.287)	-0.218 (0.247)
Tanzania	0.448	4	-0.494** (0.223)	-0.167 (0.271)	-0.359* (0.213)
Uganda	0.430	3	-0.565*** (0.217)	-0.238 (0.266)	-0.430** (0.203)
Zambia	0.413	5	-0.424* (0.231)	-0.097 (0.278)	-0.289 (0.228)
Zimbabwe	0.338	1	-0.707*** (0.213)	-0.380 (0.262)	-0.572*** (0.202)

[1] corresponds to the estimation in column [1] of Table 7 and [2] corresponds to the estimation in column [2] of Table 7. In bold are significant coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis.

*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table A 1: **Data sources**

The Afrobarometer data can be accessed at http://www.afrobarometer.org/ .
The indexes of HDI, literacy rates and the seats held by women at the national courts are available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ .
The indexes of political rights and civil liberties can be accessed at http://www.freedomhouse.org/
Polity V is available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm .

Table A 2: Description of priorities

Macro	Management of the economy, Wages income and salaries Unemployment, Rates and Taxes
Social-discrim	Poverty/Destitution, Food/shortage/Famine Education, Housing, Orphans/street children/homeless children, Health, AIDS Sickness/disease,Discrimination/inequality Gender issues/women's rights
Politics-war	Crime and security, Corruption Political violence Political instability/political division/ethnic tensions Democracy/political rights, international and civil war
Infras	Transportation,Communications Infrastructure/roads, Electricity Water supply, services, Agricultural marketing Barrage, Moulin
Agri	Farming/agriculture, Drought Land, Farm inputs

Table A 3: Descriptive Statistics for Institutions

Variable	Mean	STD	Min	Max	Data source
HDI	0.454	0.096	0.304	0.624	African Development Indicators, UNDP
Nationalseats	18.6	9.32	7	34.8	African Development Indicators, UNDP
GAP	0.812	0.162	0.522	1.150	African Development Indicators, UNDP
DEM	5.786	2.719	1	10	Polity V
PR	4.824	1.471	1	7	Freedom House
CL	4.913	1.066	2	7	Freedom House

Table A 4: Gender and priorities (version 2)

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Male	gender	-0.001 (0.029)	0.182 *** (0.031)	-0.147 *** (0.033)	-0.012 (0.028)	-0.268 *** (0.035)
No formal	educ1	0.112 ** (0.047)	0.027 (0.055)	0.111 * (0.062)	-0.105 ** (0.046)	-0.123 ** (0.054)
	educ2	0.214 *** (0.045)	-0.018 (0.051)	0.254 *** (0.058)	-0.127 *** (0.044)	-0.334 *** (0.053)
	educ3	0.358 *** (0.057)	-0.034 (0.063)	0.433 *** (0.067)	-0.273 *** (0.055)	-0.516 *** (0.071)
	educ4	0.520 *** (0.064)	-0.167 ** (0.068)	0.608 *** (0.071)	-0.374 *** (0.061)	-0.577 *** (0.082)
	Constant	-0.256 (0.156)	1.147 *** (0.133)	-1.615 *** (0.151)	0.284 ** (0.127)	-0.941 *** (0.161)
	LL	-15334	-13431	-12553	-16257	-11157
	BIC	30951	27145	25389	32797	22597
	Obs	24,926	24,926	24,926	24,926	24,926
	Nb countries	20	20	20	20	20

The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variables are policy priorities. To measure policy priorities we use the second codification defined in section 3.2. The dependent variable is Macroeconomics in [1], Social-discrimination in [2], Politics-war in [3], Infrastructure in [4] and Agriculture in [5]. All the regressors that are in column 6 of table 3 have been included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Table A 5: **Support for Democracy dropping countries**

Country	A	B		
	gender	gender	HDI*gender	PR*gender
Benin	-0.190	-0.935***	0.936***	0.0458*
Botswana	0.000519	-0.933***	0.876**	0.0522**
Burkina	-0.696***	-0.829***	0.732**	0.0473**
Cape Verde	-0.0454	-0.904***	0.836**	0.0506**
Ghana	-0.259	-0.926***	0.840**	0.0557**
Kenya	-0.304*	-0.932***	0.908***	0.0497**
Lesotho	-0.119	-0.920***	0.890**	0.0477**
Liberia	-0.226	-0.967***	0.998***	0.0468**
Madagascar	-0.263*	-0.943***	0.946***	0.0471**
Malawi	-0.863***	-0.834***	0.734**	0.0495**
Mali	-0.473***	-0.908***	0.794**	0.0559**
Mozambique	-0.175	-1.018***	1.167***	0.0404*
Namibia	0.112	-0.819***	0.586	0.0533**
Nigeria	-0.423***	-0.908***	0.871**	0.0499**
Senegal	-0.629***	-0.925***	0.714**	0.0704***
South Africa	-0.0883	-0.918***	0.859**	0.0528**
Tanzania	-0.286*	-0.925***	0.889**	0.0495**
Uganda	-0.279**	-0.960***	0.806**	0.0624**
Zambia	-0.0143	-0.946***	0.924***	0.0485**
Zimbabwe	-0.218	-1.046***	0.831**	0.0766***

The coefficients reported on each line are those obtained by dropping the country on that line.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.